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1 Introduction
Do reforming governments in poor countries have
the political latitude to redistribute assets or income
to the poor? Do redistributive initiatives stir up
implacable hostility from the rich and powerful? In
what circumstances can pro-poor reformism be
effective?2
These are big questions. I address them not
because I can offer answers valid for Bolivia today
or Mozambique tomorrow, butin order to combat
a set of misleading, pessimistic, general answers
commonly found in the literature, debates, lan-
guage and prevailing assumptions of international
development policy International development
policy orthodoxies suggest that governments of
poor countries enjoy little political latitude to prac-
tice redistribution policies. Better that they stick to
market-conforming policies and the conservative
New Poverty Agenda set by the World Bank in the
1990 World Development Report, i.e. 'pro-poor
growth', better public services for the poor, and
'safety nets' (only) for those who really need them.
There are no grounds for such general pessimism.
The first decade of the next millennium need not
see a replay of the conservatism about income and
asset distribution that has ruled in world politics
and international development policy during the
1980s and 1990s. Indeed, the current upheavals in
the international economy may provide opportuni-
ties for (radical) reformism. Aid donors and inter-
national financial institutions are unlikely to
perceive and seize those opportunities because
they, in particular, are the victims of two distinct
sources of 'global pessimism' about the prospects
that governments of poor countries will exercise
some serious options on behalf of the poor.
The first source of pessimism is a familiar set of
beliefs about the extent, nature and consequences of
globalisation. In sum, it is argued that the increasing
1 Alex Shankland made an important contribution to the
first draft of this paper. For very helpful comments on
earlier drafts, I am grateful to Stephen Devereux, David
Leonard, Judith Tendler and participants at seminars at
the Institute of Development Studies and the London
School of Economics.
I This article deals with redistribution within developing
countries, not with the issue of directing aid to the
(within country) poor.
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openness of poor economies to international trade,
transactions and capital movements seriously com-
promises the capacity of governments to take 'leftish'
policy positions. These globalisation arguments have
received a great deal of scrutiny in recent years. We
now know that they are much exaggerated.
Globalisation certainly poses obstacles to leftist poli-
cies, but does not rule them out in any consistent
fashion. I deal briefly with this issue in section 2.
The second source of pessimism, on which this arti-
cle focuses, is not a substantive set of propositions
about policy options, but a generic way of thinking
about politics, here labelled 'interest group
economism'. The implications of this approach for
the concerns of this article are indirect and allusive
- but still potentially powerful. In sum, the model
of politics around which interest group economism
is constructed implies that:
Redistribution initiatives will generate high lev-
els of opposition, polarisation and conflict.
If they are to be successful, redistribution poli-
cies require the active, mobilised support of
potential beneficiaries, i.e. the poor.
I label this the 'polarisationmobilisation thesis'.
Policymakers contemplating initiating or support-
ing the redistribution of income or assets will infer
(a) that they risk generating (uncontrollable) con-
flict, that may do all kinds of unforeseen damage;
and (b) that they need first to accomplish what is
clearly a very difficult task: to line up mass, organ-
ised support from the poor to counter the opposi-
tion from the non-poor, who as always carry a great
deal of political clout. In this non-revolutionary era
in world politics, the broad message is clear and
conservative: back off from redistribution.
I show in sections 3 to 5 that the polarisation-
mobilisation thesis provides a partial, biased and
unconvincing understanding of the politics of redis-
tribution. It is based on a mechanical simplification
of a general conception of politics - 'public choice' -
that is itself narrow but increasingly popular with
economists and with international development
institutions because it is founded on the notion that
An excellent account of the political consequences of and 1996: Chapter 1). Winters is not himself a
the mobility of capital is to be found in Winters (1994 proponent of globalisation arguments.
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politics is fundamentally like economics. 'Political
analysis' can therefore be undertaken by economists,
using the algebraic, statistical and econometric tech-
niques in which most economists specialise, for
audiences used to talking about public policy in
economistic terms. The public choice approach to
political analysis is concentrated within North
American academia and conforms more closely to
the realities of American politics than to the politics
of any other countries. It is itself a manifestation of
cultural globalisation: an initiative to disseminate to
the whole world a peculiarly American way of both
doing and analysing politics. Actual experience of
redistributive politics in poor countries is very dif-
ferent (section 6). Redistribution does not have to
lead to fierce conflict over a fixed and highly visible
cake, in which there can be only winners and losers.
Mobilising large numbers of poor people behind the
redistribution agenda, while helpful, is not the key
to success. In particular, there is scope (a) for the
rich to gain - or to believe they gain - from making
the poor better off; and (b) for creative politicians to
manage the politics of redistribution to minimise
conflict and opposition and maximise support.
2 Globalisation Dogma
We have in recent years heard a great deal about
how globalisation is undermining the capacity of
governments to take leftist or progressive policy
positions, to redistribute assets or income to the
poor, or to expand social provision. The underlying
arguments are straightforward. They rest on the
notion that globalisation has produced a relative
shift of power away from states to the controllers of
capital. Capital has become more mobile interna-
tionally3 The greater the efforts that governments
make to tax or redistribute income or capital, pre-
serve or increase social protection, or influence
where and how the private sector invests, the more
they will be 'punished' by capital. To protect their
assets, profits and prerogatives, capitalists do not
need to get together to bribe governments or con-
spire against them. Adequate warnings will be con-
veyed and punishments inflicted by capitalists
individually pursuing their own interests. They will
individually reduce investments in countries (and
cities or regions) ruled by regimes lacking in 'realism'
- or simply threaten to do so, pointing out how easy
it is for them to move money and plant away to
more favourable business environments. The spec-
tre or the reality of declining tax revenues, rising
unemployment and falling political support will be
enough to persuade most governments to accept
reality: to reduce business taxes, cancel promises to
redistribute land, dilute proposals to extend
employee rights, and postpone plans to provide a
basic income to all destitute households.
These are elegant arguments that promise to explain
a great deal about the contemporary world on the
basis of a few simple premises and facts. They are
powerful arguments that are used all over the world
to persuade national, regional and city governments
to pay special attention to the needs of capital and
capitalists. 'There is no alternative.' 'Be realistic.'
'You cannot fly in the face of globalisation'. They are
even in some respects valid arguments. In particu-
lar, in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) countries - the only part
of the globe for which we have good data - the bur-
den of taxation has shifted from capital to labour as
capital has become more mobile (The Economist,
December 5 1998: 129). But the elements of truth
need to picked out carefully from a stew of hypoth-
esis, projection, wishful thinking, propaganda and
falsehood. There is no mechanism inherent in glob-
alisation that forces governments and public policy
to the right, out of the reach of the poor and vul-
nerable, and into the clutches of forces most accu-
rately described as 'business', but often labelled 'the
market'.4 There is an alternative, contrary interpre-
tation of the political consequences of globalisation
that is better supported by evidence: that the open-
ing of national economies (i.e. globalisation) consis-
tently leads to a larger economic role for
governments, and more social protection, because it
generates economic instability that governments are
obliged to mitigate (Rodrik 1998; Rieger and
Liebfried 1998). The economic and the political
realms are not and cannot be hermetically sealed
one from the other. The political underpins the eco-
nomic. Without social and political protection
against the instabilities and uncertainties that it gen-
erates, the free market itself is at risk.
There is a growing literature demonstrating the
continuing power and autonomy of national states
despite globalisation (Evans 1997; Weiss 1998). The
welfare states of the OECD countries have been
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We still have a great deal to learn about how the
recent globalising phase in the world economy has
affected the incentives and capacities of governments
to pay attention to the needs of the poor and address
demands for social protection and the redistribution
of income and assets. However, we can reject - as
propaganda masquerading as analysis - simplistic
right-wing arguments that globalisation is undermin-
ing the scope for progressive social and economic
policies because it has drastically shifted the balance
of power from states to controllers of capital.
3 Economistic Models of Politics
Does this mean that the ideological playing field is
now level? That we can now explore the political
dimensions of poverty and anti-poverty interven-
tions in poor countries free from the fear that our
ideas are being shaped by 'globalisation ideologies',
i.e. Western, American or capital-friendly doctrines
disguised as universal truths? Unfortunately not.
For a more amorphous ideological bias - a sugges-
tion that attempts to redistribute resources from
rich to poor are typically highly polarising, conflict-
ual, politically difficult for governments, and there-
fore perhaps best avoided - is riding on the wings
not of economïc but of cultural globalisation.
Policymakers worldwide are increasingly exposed
to ideas about the fundamental character of politics
that are (a) explicitly and intentionally economistic
- i.e. based on the premise that politics is much the
same kind of self-interested bargaining game that
economics is generally held to be - and (b) in prac-
tice biased in the sense that they are:
United States-centric, i.e. reflections of America's
distinctive political culture, produced and
shaped by people and organisations based in the
United States, and propagated internationally by
people who received their higher education
there.
Universalising, in the sense that they are
intended to fit all contexts and countries into the
same (American) analytic mould.
Sceptical about the motivations for public action
reformed in a less savagely anti-poor manner than is
suggested in much of the rhetoric. Public expenditure
on welfare has been little reduced (Pierson 1996).
and the scope for governments to act effectively,
especially in relation to the poor. In the case in
hand, scepticism is achieved, via the polarisa-
tionmobilisation thesis, by representing redis-
tribution initiatives as (a) likely to lead to open
conflict between socioeconomic groups and (b)
requiring substantial political mobilisation of
poor people to be effective. From a political per-
spective, redistribution appears to be both
unwise and difficult.
Political science is far from a corpus of agreed ideas
and techniques wielded by neutral experts. There is
a great deal of controversy Analytic techniques and
methods may be used to promote positions based
more on values than on disinterested science.
Analytic procedures that are uncontentious in the
abstract may be used with consistent bias. The con-
ventional term for the type of economistic analysis of
politics that comes under fire here is 'public choice'.
I have no general quarrel with public choice, and
often find it very useful and illuminating. My quarrel
is with a particular, biased use of the public choice
approach that I label interest group economism.
However, the non-specialist reader will have little use
for abstract discussions of political science procedure
and method. Let us proceed straight to a concrete
example of how interest group economism is used to
convey negative messages about the political feasibil-
ity of redistributive policies.
4 Interest Group Economism in
Action
Our star exhibit is a recent World Bank paper that
conveys clear pessimism in a title: More for the Poor
is Less for the Poor The Politics of Targeting (Gelbach
and Pritchett 1997). That title is flanked on the
cover page by a very simple 14-word summary of
the argument: 'Will means-tested targeting help the
poor? Economics might say yes, but politics say no'.
No qualifications. No countries mentioned. How
did the two economists who authored this paper
reach such a dramatic and gloomy conclusion about
politics? Not by the reference to facts or experience.
The only poverty-related fact in 27 pages is found
For an introduction to public choice, see Dunleavy
(199 1).
Note that the issue dealt with by Gelbach and
Pritchett is not novel; there is already a considerable
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in the first paragraph, and concerns a verbal
exchange in the American House of Representatives
between Newt Gingrich and a Democratic
Congressman about the means testing of Medicare
benefits. The argument in the paper is purely
deductive and abstract.6 Stripped of its extensive
algebraic decoration, it is at heart very simple:
Citizens will give political support only to pub-
lic expenditures that benefit them and their fam-
ilies directly and materially
Attempts to limit ('target') any income transfers
only to poorer people will mean that the bulk of
the population will not provide political support
because they obtain no benefit.
Therefore, income transfer programmes will sur-
vive the competitive business of politics only if
they are not 'targeted', i.e. if large proportions of
the population are in principle eligible.
This may not be a very pessimistic conclusion in the
US context. Indeed, many American 'progressives'
argue the same line (e.g. Skocpol 1990), and are
forced to do so by the unusual degree to which the
American political system encourages and rewards
narrowly self-interested voting behaviour (see
below). But Gelbach and Prïtchett are writing for the
World Bank about poor countries, where 'universal-
ism' in public transfers is just not on the cards. Poor
governments cannot afford it, and the World Bank
does not encourage them to try What are the logical
implications of their analysis for poor countries? The
first and most evident is that attempts to redistribute
ïncomes through the public budget will not work
because there will not be enough political support.
The second implication is less evident at first sight:
a tacit endorsement of the polarisationmobilisation
thesis: that redistribution initiatives are likely to be
conflictual, dangerous and difficult, and that politi-
cians should beware getting involved.
The polarisationmobilisation thesis is implicit in the
way in which Gelbach and Pritchett model the polit-
ical process. We need to examine that in more detail.
literature on it, much of it more empirical material, and
some published by the World Bank itself. See various
contributions to Van Der Walle and Neat (1995); and
Van Der Walle (1998).
But first a disclaimer. I am not criticising Gelbach and
Pritchett for their use of the core assumption that
underlies public choice analysis in all its forms: that
political action is driven by the rational pursuit of
material self-interest. They could have stuck to the
rational self-interest assumption and yet produced a
very different picture of the politics of redistribution
if they had made different assumptions in opera-
tionalising that core assumption. The public choice
paradigm is not intrinsically right-wing. However, it
may easily be used in this way through the choice of
simplifying assumptions (Dunleavy 1991: 4-6).
Gelbach and Pritchett descend to interest group
economism through the following procedure:
First, they have a narrow conception of self-
interest. They decided that political actors (actu-
ally, voters) would be acting in their rational
self-interest solely and simply if they tried to
minimise their personal contributions to govern-
ment revenue and maximise the subsidies they
could receive from government. There is no
scope for taxpayers to conclude, for example,
that it might be in their own self-interest to pay
for governments to provide the poor with hous-
ing, health care, drinking water, education or-
other resources.
Second, they reduce the number of potential
political actors and the interactions between
them by assuming that individuals will aggregate
into interest groups without ambiguity or chOice.
They need only one piece of information about a
person, e.g. that she is rich, middle income or
poor, to assign her to an interest group.
Third, they assume that interest groups are
united and divided along class-like lines at a
national level: political competition is some vari-
ant of rich against poor (rich/middle against
poor; rich against middle/poor, etc.).
Considerations of ethnicity, region, language,
ideology, belief, religion and established party
loyalty play no role in the process in which indi-
viduals gang up into groups.
Fourth, the relative influence of interest groups
is measured mechanically in terms of numbers
of members (votes). No account is taken, for
example, of differential political commitment or
differential leadership, skills.
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Fifth, it is assumed that there is a high level of
public awareness of any attempts to redistribute
income or assets, and that people understand
the net implications for them personally of
attempts not only to, for example, double public
pension benefits but also to change the basis on
which the prices of subsidised foodstuffs are
adjusted for inflation, or alter budgetary alloca-
tions for public works projects. Every piece of
the public budget is the subject of highly
informed political competition, between those
asked to fund it and those who might hope to
benefit from it.
Sixth, it is assumed that policy decisions will be
made solely as a result of the interaction between
interest groups. Politicians and governments are
not actors in their own right, but passive pup-
pets of these interest groups. (There are no inter-
national influences: this is a model only of
domestic politics.)
Why these assumptions? The immediate answer is
technical. Each of these analytic choices simplifies
the political scenario, and helps make it possible for
Gelbach and Pritchett to achieve their goal of mod-
elling, with algebra, the politics of redistribution.
While the conclusion of their paper, cited above, is
pithy and in plain English, almost all the content is
algebra or text that explains the algebra. To the non-
economist, it appears to be complex material. In
reality, it describes a very elementary model of the
political process involving very few actors, with
unambiguous identities and preferences, and single
objectives. Had Gelbach and Pritchett not made all
these simplifying assumptions, the algebra would
have failed them. There would have been far too
much to put in the model: too many political
actors, too many interactions, too many potential
coalitions or deals to consider, too much ambiguity
about the objectives of actors, and too many poten-
tial sets of groups into which they might organise
themselves. Many academic journals are full of sim-
ilar pieces of public choice analysis, some contain-
ing facts and quantitative analysis, but all making
very similarly sparse assumptions about the game of
politics, justified in terms of making algebraic mod-
elling or statistical analysis feasible.
Even if innocent in intention, this simplification is
not innocent in terms of consequences. For the
simplifications produce a consistently biased image of
the nature of politics. Let us list their simplifying
assumptions in a more abstract form and think about
the implications of the image of politics that emerges:
All actors pursue short-term self-interest.
Individuals aggregate into interest groups that
are exclusive in membership (i.e. non-overlap-
ping) and constituted according to national level
class-like' criteria (i.e. richpoor, capital-
labour) that almost automatically imply conflict-
ing interests.
Policy is made by the ïnteraction of competing
interest groups, with politicians acting simply as
figureheads and the state merely providing the
arena and rules for the competition. There is no
possibility that policy could be shaped by a state
or a government motivated by some encom-
passing, long-term appreciation of the public
interest.
There is a very high level of information about
the actual and potential uses of public resources,
and the implications for individuals and groups.
Every element of public policy becomes the
potential subject for political conflict between
citizens.
Each policy decision is treated by the combat-
ants as a unique event. They do not concern
themselves about how their attitudes and behav-
iour in a given case might affect their chances of
finding cooperative allies in other (simultaneous
or later) contests.
Start from these assumptions, and you are virtually
bound to end with the conclusion that politics,
however civilly conducted, is at heart a dog-eat-dog
business. The real worlds of politics are not just dif-
ferent, but consistently different. I argue this point in
more detail in section 6. Let us for the moment
focus on one dimension: the fact that the real world
complexities that Gelbach and Pritchett filter out
from their model in most cases reduce the heat of
political conflicts and increase the prospects for
compromise.
In the real world, political identities are ambiguous
and plastic. Jose might waver and oscillate between
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regarding himself primarily as a banana grower, a
proud citizen of Paraiba Province, an ardent
Protestant, a firm supporter of the Federalist Party,
a man of pure Castilian descent, and loyal to every-
one who can claim kinship. Self-interest is complex
and malleable. I might welcome the banning of
street-traders from the area where I have my store
because it will attract more wealthy customers; but
I might also perceive a threat to my quality of life if
this pushes more people into street crime and petty
theft. Interest groups are multiple and overlapping.
The potential opposition of taxpayers to food sub-
sidies may be much muted if landowners' associa-
tions decide that this will expand the market for
farm produce. The political alliances and under-
standings that exist in relation to one policy issue
carry over into others. The National Industrial
Workers Federation and the Manufacturers
Association know they need to cooperate to defend
industrial subsidies from budget-cutting neo-liber-
als. That knowledge tempers the aggression each
might otherwise display in contesting new employ-
ment legislation. In the language of game theory,
politics is a set of repeated (and simultaneous)
games, not a series of one-shot games that have no
connection one with another.
5 Progressive Interest Group
Economism?
Interest group economism represents a boiling down
of both the realities of political life and the potential
analytic insights of public choice theory into a sim-
ple, mechanical evaluation of the assumed relative
weights of citizens' assumed policy preferences. It is
consistently right-wing in implication when used to
address the politics of redistribution. It is not, how-
ever, right-wing in inspiration. There are left-wing
versions, intended to help define the conditions
under which public policy will be pro-poor. The
work of Alain de Janvry and other economists at the
University of California, Berkeley exemplifies the
best of this tradition: technically sophisticated,
grounded in a more realistic model of political soci-
ety than the work of Gelbach and Pritchett,
informed by understandings of the effects of policy
choices on the (rural) poor in Ecuador and India,
and driven by the search for policy coalitions that
will support pro-poor policies (De Janvry et al.,
199O). De Janvry and collaborators summarise
their work as follows:
Policy reforms and, more specifically, anti-rural
poverty programs can only be implemented and
sustained if politically feasible. While econo-
mists have learned to calculate the growth and
welfare effects of policy reforms, using in par-
ticular computable general equilibrium and
market models, the calculus of political feasibil-
ity is still in its infancy Based on the body of
theoretical and empirical knowledge about the
determinants of political influence and the rela-
tive autonomy of the state in policymaking, we
have specified an index to measure the political
feasibility of alternative reforms directed at rural
poverty alleviation. This has allowed us to iden-
tify a number of promising avenues to politi-
cally feasible reforms, in particular by choosing
programs that induce the emergence of sup-
portive coalitions dominated by the urban sec-
tor and the nonpoor. Key for that purpose is to
choose programs that minimise the incidence of
costs on the rich, that allow for leakages to
groups of nonpoor, that create general equilib-
rium effects that benefit the urban sector, and
that induce linkage effects that promote growth
and urban incomes [p. 3661.
There is no space here fully to explain the analytic
procedures followed by de Janvry and collabora-
tors. lt is sufficient for present purposes to highlight
a few points. On the positive side, they accept that
the state' might be a political actor along with inter-
est groups. Their basic model incorporates five
political actors: rural poor; rural rich; urban poor;
urban rich; and the state. Further, they attempt in
principle to integrate political with economic analy-
sis. This increases the chances of identifying com-
mon interests between rich and poor: the economic
cake is assumed to be growing; and some of the
mechanisms for expanding it, such as subsidising
chemical fertilisers for the rural poor, might at the
same time make urban populations better off by
providing them with cheaper food. However, this
For similar work in relation to land reform, see De
Janvry and Sadoulet (1989). Their work enters into UN
documents on poverty alleviation strategies (e.g. Gaiha
1993; Chapter 10).
'Since a political feasibility index is too demanding to
estimate econometrically, there are two approaches that
we combine to specify and quantify this index. One is
to use the vast theoretical and empirical literature on
collective action and the ideas that it suggests as to what
39
attempt to integrate political and economic analysis
leads to problems. First, it implies some heroic
assumptions about information: that, for example,
the rich will support subsidies for poor farmers' fer-
tiliser because they understand the complex eco-
nomic interactions through which this will
ultimately make them (the rich) better off. Second,
this integration cannot be achieved in the analysis
for reasons that our previous discussion allows us to
predict: the econometrics would be too compli-
cated (p. 252). The methods actually used to con-
struct the index of political feasibility are much
more intuitive and subjective.8
My fundamental concern about the work of de
Janvry and collaborators is not how they construct
the index of political feasibility, but their very con-
ception of 'political feasibility'. lt is evident from the
quotation above that they define this in terms of the
relative weights of self-seeking interest groups for
and against a particular policy. This has elsewhere
been termed 'power-balance determinism' (Ascher
1984: 6-7). A policy is considered 'feasible' if it has
more weight of self-interest for it than against it. The
evidence that it is 'feasible' is that it happened. Other
development economists talk in the same way.9 All
variants of this narrow interest group economism are
going to lead to pessimism about redistribution via
the polarisationmobilisation thesis - unless one
really believes it is feasible to mobilise the poor and
thereby shift the balance of power in their favour. To
tell politicians that that they should only take a pro-
poor policy stance if they can first achieve great feats
of political mobilisation is to discourage them. Even
if possible, such mobilisation could be self-defeat-
ing, through evoking the defensive counter-mobili-
sation of the non-poor. And, especially in the
present world climate of political conservatism, the
idea of large-scale antagonistic mobilisätion is likely
to frighten governments. Stirring calls to solve
poverty by mobilising the poor are probably
counter-productive. It is disappointing that the
should enter in this index and what is the relative
importance of its components. The other is to calibrate
ex post the index on some well known policy patterns
that the index should be able correctly to predict' (p.
352).
For example, Rich et al. (1997) attempt to estimate the
effect of African structural adjustment programmes on
income distribution, but title their work 'Political
Feasibility of Structural Adjustment in Afnca'.
interest group economism that underlies this
emphasis on mobilising the poor should have pene-
trated the thinking of the United Nations
Development Programme, one of the most influen-
tial and pro-poor of the UN agencies. The UNDP
1997 Human Development Report (UNDP 1997)
states that 'Achievements in eradicating human
poverty depend first and foremost [emphasis added]
on people's ability to articulate their demands and
mobilize for collective action' (p. 95). That, as expe-
rience demonstrates, is a misleading simplification.
6 The Real Politics of Anti-
Poverty
Simplification is no sin. We are not interested in pil-
lorying interest group economism, or public choice
theory more generally, for presenting a streamlined
picture of the real political world. Simplification is
the price we pay to test general propositions and
thus advance our knowledge on some kind of sci-
entific basis. Simplification only becomes sinful if it
leads to consistently biased conclusions. In this case
it does. Interest group economism propagates con-
sistently biased, misleading analyses of the politics
of redistribution in four main ways, that fall neatly
into two pairs. First, as has already been suggested
in section 4 (the polarisationmobilisation thesis),
it exaggerates two things:
The societal conflict and polarisation that redis-
tribution is likely to generate.
The extent to which success depends on mobil-
ising large numbers of beneficiaries - the poor -
behind a redistribution agenda and movement.
Second, it underestimates two things:
The extent to which members of political, gov-
ernmental and other elites - and indeed middle
classes more generally - may perceive them-
selves to have a positive interest in the redistrib-
ution of income or assets to the poor.
The autonomy that governments and political
leaders enjoy to exercise political leadership in
favour of redistribution - to control information,
Albert Hirschman much earlier work, Journeys
Toward Progress. Studies of Economic Policy-making in
Latin America, is, however, similar in spirit and still a
source of inspiration (Hirschman 1963).
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manipulate symbols, determine agendas, take
initiatives, define the public interest, create
coalitions, and confuse opponents.
6.1 Polarisation?
The canard that redistribution initiatives will typi-
cally polarise society between haves and have-nots
has been exposed in abstract terms in section 4.
There are typically many actors and interests, and
complex, unstable patterns of competition and
cooperation between them. The politics of redistn-
bution is more like recurrent, shifting squabbles
within extended families than the fierce antagonism
of divorcing couples. We can conclude that discus-
sion by looking at the lessons from experience in
William Ascherb Scheming for the Poor: The Politics of
Redistribution in Latin America (1984). This book
draws some general conclusions about the politics
of redistribution in poor countries by examining the
experiences of Argentina, Chile and Peru between
the 1940s and the 1970s. I know of no other
attempt to uncover the general principles underly-
ing the politics of redistribution in poor countries,
and rely on it substantially in this sectionJ° The fol-
lowing quotation, and the material and analysis that
underlie it, drive a stake through the heart of the
polarisation thesis:
The most common image of the struggle for
redistribution has been one of open confronta-
tion between the fully committed pro-distribu-
tionist leader and the united, devious,
unqualifiedly vindictive opposition. If valid, this
image of the hero of the poor confronting the
united front of the rich would be a gloomy one
for the reformist, though perhaps a source of
inspiration for the radïcal. The image is at once
pessimistic and cynical. It is rare enough to find
a leader who is fully committed to redistribution
when his own political survival is at stake. The
prospects of redistribution are also limited if it is
assumed that the die is cast in the initial com-
mitment and heroism of the leader. More pes-
simistic still is the assumption that that
redistribution is of necessity highly confronta-
tional. If indeed the redistribution-minded leader
had to proceed against out-and-out opposition,
particularly against a united enemy, the climate
of investment would be so poisoned that decent
aggregate economic performance, so important
for the general welfare and the durability of the
redistributive reforms, would be virtually pre-
cluded ... tAscher 1984: 3031
6.2 Mobilisation?
Further quotations from Ascher help allay the
heroic myth that successful redistribution typically
entails the large-scale supporting mobilisation of
the poor to counter the influence of the well-con-
nected and influential rich:
The case studies show that the image of the
poor confronting the rich is profoundly mis-
leading. On the one hand, the most effective
strategy for securing the political viability of a
redistributive policy often is to gain the backing
of a selected part of the higher-income popula-
tion ... On the other hand, one of the most seri-
ous problems of carrying out redistributive
programs is that the already-benefited poor
often resist the spread of benefits to other seg-
ments of the needy [Ascher 1984: 34]
the support of beneficiaries is of limited
political value: those who have already bene-
fited from redistribution are not likely to behave
in grateful ways, and those who may benefit
from contemplated redistributive policies are
often incapable of being mobilized sufficiently
to help the government vis-à-vis typical opposi-
tion tactics. [Ascher 1984: 3101
There are many sub-sets of 'the poor', often with
opposing interests with respect to a gïven eco-
nomic policy Food subsidies for the urban poor,
generally engineered to the detriment of the
rural poor, are the classic example. The implica-
tion is that mobilizing 'the poor,' far from being
a straightforward task, turns out to be a compli-
cated and often unrewarding exercise insofar as
the differences among lower-income segments
are likely to be substantial and politically divi-
sive. [Ascher 1984: 310-111"
For a parallel argument about the politics of the
creation of European welfare states, see Baldwin (1990).
"Some of the greatest successes of effective state
welfarism in low-income situations can be traced back
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6.3 Commonwealth
Why might the rich or the middle classes, even if
self-ínterested, be willing to pay a little more in tax
to benefit the poor, give them a larger slice of the
public health budget, or even agree to have some of
their land bought out from under them for redistri-
bution? And why might political and governmental
elites make some effort to bring about these out-
comes? One set of answers is found in the articles in
this volume by John Toye, Noushin Kalati and
James Manor, and Naomi Hossain and myself, and
does not require further discussion here. Poverty
has a range of relatively direct adverse conse-
quences for the non-poor: political instability,
crime, disease, unattractive physical environments
and psychologically disturbing public encounters
with the poor. In addition, poverty may be believed
to impact negatively on the non-poor by weakening
the nation in economic, symbolic and military com-
petition with other countries - a poor population so
ignorant and unlettered that they can make little
contribution to modernising the economy; so con-
spicuously wretched that they are an embarrass-
ment to members of the elite; and so stunted and
ignorant that they make indifferent protectors of the
homeland.
Another set of answers is to be found in intra-elite
political competition, and the competitive appeals
for mass political support to which this leads. The
recent spread of democracy in developing countries
is tending to intensify that competition. National
elites do not necessarily have a common interest or
behave as a distinct, unified political unit simply
because their members all enjoy wealth and status.
Many are deeply fractured along ethnic, party or
other lines, and strive hard to mobilise support from
sections of the poor.'2 Doing something about
poverty is one of the most reliable ways of obtaining
that support. But how much scope do political lead-
ers have to persuade the non-poor to support or pay
for the redistribution of resources to the poor? Do
they not still run up against the hard reality,
expressed algebraically by Gelbach and Pritchett,
that citizens will only pay for public programmes
from which they expect to benefit themselves?
to intra-elite competition for mass support. In Sri
Lanka, this intra-elite competition had a major ethnic
dimension (Moore 1985).
6.4 Political leadership
I have already noted above that there is no political
leadership of any kind in the Gelbach and Pritchett
model: no governments, and no politicians. Policy
choices reflect simply the weights of interest
groups; the state merely enforces the rules about
how these interest groups may compete; and politi-
cians are either figureheads for interest groups or
passive brokers negotiating the relationships
between them. These omissions are characteristic of
a great deal of public choice analysis. Conceptually,
two large areas of 'real politics' are missing. The first
is the fact that states and state agencies often have
interests of their own." The second is that political
leaders - i.e. state and political organisations, and
the individuals and groups that lead them - have
considerable political resources of their own: infor-
mation, organisation, ability to take the initiative
and establish the political agenda, symbolic power
and legitimacy, etc. Political leaders are not passive
registers of the preferences of citizens and interest
groups. They use their own political resources, both
to shape citizen preferences (Dunleavy 1991), and
to implement policies in such a way that many citi-
zens are unsure what is happening, and therefore
find it difficult to oppose (Ascher 1984).
Poverty has not been a priority for many govern-
ments since the 1970s. The focus in the developing
world has been on macro-economic policy and
structural adjustment. It is easy to forget that, in
earlier decades, governments of poor countries like
China and Tanzania exercised their moral and sym-
bolic authority to establish poverty alleviation as
priority national goals. Paradoxically, we can
remind ourselves of the extent to which govern-
ments of many poor countries do exercise moral
and symbolic authority by looking at the experience
of structural adjustment.
Early structural adjustment initiatives generated a
substantial research literature cast within the frame-
work of interest group economism. The dominant
theme was that structural adjustment was going to
impose substantial, immediate, certain costs on
small but well-organised (rent-seeking) groups who
had been benefiting from statist economic policies,
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but hold out the promise of material benefits to
other, broader sections of society only in the longer
term once the reforms began to work. lt followed
from the assumption of rationally self-interested
political action that citizen resistance to economic
reform was going to be fierce and support for it
minimal. Therefore governments, supported by aid
donors and international financial institutions, were
going to have to be tough in turn. They would have
to push through the economic reforms, and hope to
make them stick long enough for the economic
benefits to begin to flow (Toye 1992). This diagno-
sis of the politics of reform legitimised anti-democ-
ratic deals between governments and international
financial institutions; led to the problem of lack of
commitment to, or ownership of, reform by devel-
oping country governments; and focused too much
attention on political rather than economic consid-
erations in sequencing reforms (bye, forthcoming).
It was also a wrong political diagnosis. More recent
research reveals that (a) citizens often have little
understanding of the implications for their own
welfare of economic reform packages; (b) in evalu-
ating reforms, they often exhibit much more con-
cern for the general well-being of the nation than of
the implications for their own pocket; (c) there has
been much more support for reform than was pre-
dicted through public choice analysis; (d) reform
has generated less political violence and disorder
than was initially predicted; and (e) that citizen
support for reform depends substantially on politi-
cal variables, such as their party affiliation and gen-
eral trust in the national political leadership (e.g.
Bates 1993; Grindle 1997-8; Haggard 1993;
Kaufman 1998).
This mature understanding of the politics of struc-
tural adjustment illustrates the capacity of (some)
governments in the developing world credibly to
talk the language of 'the public interest', and to
persuade citizens to accept and vote for policies
that appear to be contrary to their short-term
material self-interests. There is every reason to
believe that many governments and politicians can
exercise political leadership in the same way on
behalf of the poor. In doing that, they still face
actual and potential opposition from those likely
Public choice analysts sometimes include states or self-interested political behaviour. In what sense can
state agencies as independent actors in their models, but collective entities have a rational self-interest distinct
face serious conceptual and empirical problems because from that of the individuals who constitute them
this conflicts with their core assumption of rationally (Dunleavy 1991: Chapter 7)?
to lose. To overcome that opposition, political
leaders can use a wide range of political resources.
Ascher's study of the politics of redistribution in
three Latin American countries provides us with a
good sense of the tactics and strategies that may be
employed.
Ascher's book deals with 'normal statecraft' in the
particular context of redistribution policies: there is
no 'how-to-do-it' argument to be summarised
briefly He points out that, when it comes to tactics
and strategy, governments have four main dimen-
sions of choice (Ascher 1984: 30 5-8):
Instruments to be used - some open, like the
legislature, some closed like the central bank;
some visible and likely to alert the opposition,
some so esoteric that the opposition may not
know what has happened until after the event.
Presentation - distinguishing between what gov-
ernment says it is doing and what it is actually
doing.
Linkage - the choice of allies, that affects both
the perception of policy and the breadth of sup-
port that can be obtained.
Timing - including whether to use a time of real
or apparent crisis to push through measures that
would not be supported during periods of 'poli-
tics as usual'.'4
Britain's New Labour government is adamant that
the middle classes should not be allowed to
believe that they are paying (more) tax to benefit
the poor. Since being elected in May 1997, it has
achieved a significant redistribution of income to
the poor. But it has accomplished this in a covert
fashion, adhering strongly to the slogan of 'no tax
increases', but actually raising additional revenue
through measures that do not appear to impact
directly on voters: a windfall tax on the profits of
privatised utilities; quietly raiding pension funds
by changing the rules for the payment of Advance
Corporation Tax; and continuing to close tax loop-
holes for the rich. The same statecraft was at work
when, for example, Juan Peron first hit Argentina
"For an excellent presentation of the role of perceived
crisis in economic policymaking in poor countries, see
Grindle and Thomas (1991).
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rural oligarchs from an unexpected quarter by
using new state marketing boards to siphon off
export surpluses for urban job creation (Ascher
1984: 54-5); and the Frei government in Chile
raised revenue for its social programmes through a
lot of fancy footwork and diversionary tactics over
taxes that overcame a great deal of opposition from
the wealthy (Ascher 1984: 128-31). Reformers
sometimes get their tactics and strategy wrong
(Ascher, 1984: 131-4). And the same tactics can
be used to oppose redistribution. The point is sim-
ply that governments and political leaders have
considerable political resources of their own; they
are not passive instruments of self-interested pres-
sure groups.
7 Conclusion
We need not be too concerned about the argument
that the governments have become prisoners of
globalisation and the mobility of capital, and for
that reason will be unable to do much directly for
the poor. Globalisation arguments are coming
under a great deal of critical scrutiny, and their
weaknesses are already evident (section 2). Public
choice analysis poses more of a challenge. Part of its
attractiveness to policymakers in recent years has
lain in the ease with which it can be used to gener-
ate right-wing, state-sceptical policy advice. But it
will continue to command attention in a less overtly
right-wing era and, in relation to issues of redistrib-
ution, to exercise a right-wing influence. Despite
the existence of apparently left-wing variants, the
public choice paradigm comes close to being inher-
ently right-wing in practice. For technical reasons
alone, it tends to transmute into simple interest
group economism and to lead to the polarisa-
tionmobilisation thesis: the notion that redistribu-
tion is politically very difficult.
Why will the public choice paradigm continue to be
influential in applied development policy? Because
it provides a style of analysis that fits into a global
policymaking culture that is shaped by economics,
oriented to finding general truths valid for many
countries, and as much American as global in some
more neutral sense.
7.1 Economics
Economics continues its protracted, world-wide
advance toward both practical and symbolic hege-
mony within the field of public policymaking, further
displacing the lawyers, engineers, generalist adminis-
trators and businessmen who, in the early decades of
this century were generally believed to command the
specialist knowledge and expertise required to advise
politicians on policy or directly to run governments
(Markoff and Montecinos 1993). Interpretations of
politics couched in economists' paradigms and lan-
guage are likely to have a growing appeal to policy-
makers. An increasing proportion of top political
positions in poor and middle income countries are
occupied by economists - especially graduates of US
universities and, sometimes, former staff members of
international financial institutions (Grindle 1996:
34-5; Markoff and Montecinos 1993: 39-40).
7.2 Generalising
Economic policy is increasingly made or influenced
by international organisations seeking to standard-
ise procedures and policies across many different
nations. The international organisations that under-
take and commission political analysis are likely to
continue to look mainly to economists to do this.
The economistic approach to politics has several
attractions to the more intellectual and research-ori-
ented parts of, for example, the World Bank:'5
It is familiar to the economists.
It is oriented to seeking general conclusions
valid for a large number of countries, not the
case-specific details that are the staple of much
conventional political science.
There is at least the appearance of an operational
consensus around framing research questions,
while conventional political science is intellectu-
ally more fractured, more likely to generate con-
troversy among practitioners over basic
paradigm issues, and thus a less credible instru-
ment for policy analysis.
S The results of the World Bankk own research are
showcased in the World Bank Research Observer. I
examined the 142 articles that appear in the 21 most
recent issues, from Volumes 5 (3) to 12 (1). Only eight
of these articles were 'political' in the sense that they
were setting out to explain patterns of politics or policy
Of those eight, six were within the public choice
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Conventional political science relies on the
kinds of detailed case studies that, if conducted
under the aegis of international organisations,
would tend to generate diplomatic controversy
with aggrieved member governments.
Public choice analysis is well established in lead-
ing American university economics depart-
ments, and thus has credibility within the main
professional reference arena of leading econo-
mists at places like the World Bank.'6
7.3 American
The conventional public choice conception of poli-
tics, especially that implicit in interest group
economism, conforms more closely to the realities of
American politics than to the politics of any other
country Look at the following features of the US
political system: a decentralised territorial structure
of government; separation of powers between differ-
ent branches of government; a strong system of judi-
cial review; decentralised (i.e. weak) political parties;
legislators who are individually highly dependent on
funding and personnel support from pressure groups
rather than their party machines and have wide free-
dom to initiate legislation; and high levels of educa-
tion and information availability. It is in these
circumstances unusually difficult for (national) gov-
ernments or top political leaders to discipline and
lead parties and other branches of government, or to
shape citizens' political preferences. American gov-
ernments and politicians spend more time accom-
modating (diverse) voters' preferences than do their
counterparts in other democracies. The image of pol-
itics found in interest group economism, where each
policy decision reflects the relative financial and
organisational power of competing interest groups
rather than a broader strategy of an authoritative
national political leadership, is close to the American
reality (Dunleavy 1991: especially 136-44). No sur-
prise that US-based academics and organisations find
universal validity in interest group economism. But
the assumptions about the institutional context of
political action are crucial. Dunleavy demonstrates
paradigm. (The exceptions were A. Cukierman and S. B.
Webb in Volume 9 (3) and B. Levy in Volume 7 (2)).
"leading US economics journals are wholly or
largely devoted to public choice material. See, in
particular, Journal of Political Economy and Quarterly
Journal of Economics.
that, retaining the assumption of rational self-inter-
ested political action, one can make institutional
assumptions that are more realistic for most contexts
and produce conclusions about policy options that
are much more practical and much less doctrinaire
than those we have come to associate with public
choice (Dunleavy 1991).'
Finally and more specifically, the scepticism about
the political feasibility of redistribution that public
choice embodies dovetails with prevalent ortho-
doxy in the leading Anglophone nations. Welfare
reform in the United States - the Personal
Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act of
August 1996 - constitutes the most visible indica-
tion of a retreat from welfarism in the rich world. In
his Culture of Contentment, John Kenneth Galbraith
argues that this retreat is the result not of passing
fashion but of changes in socioeconomic structure
(Galbraith 1992). Crudely, the two thirds of the
population who pay direct taxes and determine
the results of elections are decreasingly willing to
l Political scientists sceptical of rational choice have
been busy in recent years digging up evidence on how
the institutional context shapes political action. Steinmo
(1989 and 1995) and Steinmo and Tolbert (1998), for
example, have some graphic conclusions relating to tax
policies.
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